Factors determining international and regional Migration in Europe.

European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions

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Country codes

EU15

AT	Austria
BE	Belgium
DK	Denmark
FI	Finland
FR	France
DE	Germany
EL	Greece
IE	Ireland
IT	Italy
LU	Luxembourg
NL	Netherlands
PT	Portugal
ES	Spain
SE	Sweden
UK	United Kingdom

NMS

CZ	Czech Republic
CY	Cyprus
EE	Estonia
HU	Hungary
LV	Latvia
LT	Lithuania
MT	Malta
PL	Poland
SK	Slovakia
SI	Slovenia

AC

BG	Bulgaria
RO	Romania

Candidate country

TR	Turkey

Abbreviations

EU15	The EU15 Member States prior to May 2004
EU25	The EU25 Member States after May 2004
NMS	The 10 new Member States that joined the EU in May 2004
AC2	Two acceding countries, Bulgaria and Romania, that joined the EU in January 2007

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Research project: Analysis of Eurobarometer data on mobility

Introduction

With the accession of 10 new Member States to the European Union in May 2004, the issue of geographical and labour market mobility within Europe has risen to the top of the EU policy agenda. The European Commission designated the year 2006 as 'European Year of Workers' Mobility'. The initiative aimed to inform EU citizens about the following issues: the benefits and the costs of both geographical mobility and job or labour market mobility; the realities of working in another country or changing job or career; and the rights and entitlements of migrant workers. The initiative also aimed to promote the exchange of good practice between public authorities and institutions, the social partners and the private sector, and to promote further examination of the scale and nature of geographical and job mobility within the Union.

In order to get a better view on the complex phenomenon of mobility in Europe, the European Commission carried out a Eurobarometer survey on geographical and labour market mobility in September 2005 (EB 64.1). The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions analysed the findings of the survey and published different aspects in a series of six publications. The first is an overview report by Vandenbrande et al (2006), which presents a descriptive analysis of the data collected and examines four key areas of research: EU policy, geographical mobility, job mobility and restricted mobility. Five in-depth reports deal with a specific aspect of mobility. The present report focuses on factors determining international and regional mobility in Europe. Other reports deal with occupational mobility, the economic benefits of mobility, the effects of mobility on job satisfaction, and voluntary and forced job mobility. All the reports are available on the Foundation website at **http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/migration.htm**

The idea in the field of economics – but also in the broader social sciences field– is that there are potential gains from both geographic and job mobility. Firstly, such gains are derived from the relocation of labour from regions with a surplus of workers to regions with labour shortages. Secondly, such potential gains result from a more efficient allocation of labour to activities and regions where they are (likely to be) more productive.

According to the European Commission, the number of non-nationals in the EU amounted to 5.5% of the total population in 2004 (European Commission, 2006, p. 210), the large majority of foreign nationals coming from outside the EU, followed by nationals from other EU15 countries. Only about 0.2% of the total population of the EU15 came from one of the new Member States (NMS). Relatively larger shares of foreign nationals were observed in Ireland, Austria, and Germany (*ibid*). The fear, however, is that the free movement of workers in Europe could lead to a large and uncontrolled migration flow from east to west, that is to say from the NMS to the so-called 'old' EU15 Member States. Although the true dimension of migration is difficult to assess empirically, a number of studies have attempted to do exactly this. A recent Dutch study by Ecorys suggests that if the Netherlands were to open its borders to workers from the NMS, an estimated 53,000 to 63,000 workers would move to the country within a year (Ecorys, 2006). This would indeed represent a substantial increase in foreign population in the country, given that only 30,000 work permits were issued in 2005. An econometric study by Boeri and Brücker (2001) forecasts that the number of immigrants from the NMS in the old Member States might increase from less than one million in 1998 to some three to 4.5 million people in 2030 (see also European Commission, 2001). Layard et al (1994) expect that some three million people from the NMS will have migrated to the EU15 in 15 years' time. A Dutch study by de Mooij (2000) estimates a migration-potential of three to four million people, following EU enlargement. Zimmerman (1995) even refers to higher estimates ranging from five to 50 million migrants from eastern Europe within 10 to 15 years. Recent research based on micro data also suggests that the accession of the new EU member countries has boosted mobility intentions in those countries (Vandenbrande et al, 2006).[1] Several other studies based on the analysis of data on migration intentions also suggest that the readiness to move

[1] Between 2002 and 2005, there was a notable increase in migration intentions of new Member States' citizens when compared to citizens of the 'old' Member States. This increase, noted in the NMS, was 2.4 times greater than the increase noted in the EU15.

to another country is high among nationals of some of the NMS (Krieger, 2004; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004). See also Fassmann and Münz (2002) for an extensive overview of macro and micro econometric studies devoted to the estimation of migration flows from east to west.

The economic and social policy issues at stake are clear. The topic is politically loaded and intensely debated in most European societies. In light of the expected migration flows, EU Member States have adopted several transition arrangements to accommodate migration for eight out of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004 (with the exception of Cyprus and Malta). At present, these measures range from opening borders to migrants, as is the case in Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, intermediate approaches such as simplified entry criteria, as in France, Italy and Luxembourg, selective migration, as in Belgium and the Netherlands, to closing the borders until 2009, as is the case in Austria, Denmark and Germany.

One expected crucial effect of migration from east to west is that the new migrants will compete with low-skilled nationals, which will depress wages at the lower end of the income distribution and exacerbate inequalities. Evidence exists that migrants are indeed over-represented in blue-collar jobs compared to white-collar jobs (OECD, 2001, pp. 173, 176). Furthermore, Lejour et al (2001) using a general equilibrium model for the world economy show that, although the economic effects of EU enlargement are positive, in some cases, they are dominated by negative migration effects of workers with average skill levels. This leads – as is particularly evident in Germany – to a decrease of the low wage/high wage income differential, and also to a reduction of the gross domestic product (GDP) per head. This negative effect of migration also increases – and extends to other countries – when it is assumed that migrants are exclusively low-skilled.

Besides the economic effects, the current policy and societal debate centres on the supposed social and cultural effects of large scale east to west migration in Europe; for example, its consequences for the national culture of individual European nation-states, or the societal effects of substantial migration inflows for the receiving country. Everything points to the fact that the migration issue ranks at the top of the current policy and societal matters of interest, both at national and European level. It is very likely, moreover, that the migration discussion will not fade away. The persistence of the migration issue is caused by the fact that migration is not only an economic matter, but also a matter affected by very basic social, cultural and psychological concerns.

This research report focuses on migration intentions of Europeans and investigates the main factors determining these intentions. The main advantage of studying mobility intentions – rather than studying migrants in their destination country – is that this approach is not biased by selectivity issues. There is indeed a large body of literature showing that migrants self-select in labour markets where their return-to-skills is expected to be larger. Moreover, literature suggests that it is not simply mobility that is of interest in socioeconomic models, but the potential for mobility.[2] More specifically, this study investigates four main issues:

1. the micro and macro determinants of intended cross-border and regional mobility;
2. the impact of past experience with mobility – and the motive thereof – on future intended cross-border and regional mobility;
3. mobility intentions of people in the new and old Members States;
4. the main barriers and triggers to cross-border mobility within Europe.

[2] For a similar approach, see also Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004).

In doing so, this study aims to provide an analysis of the current societal and policy debate on assumed effects of migration flows in Europe, with more solid empirical input, by outlining the main determinants of Europeans' migration intentions. Such an input will hopefully generate a more accurate assessment of the migration intention potential in Europe. Estimating the intention to migrate ought to be based on a careful analysis of how people psychologically weigh the pros and cons of migration. This study seeks to contribute to such an analysis. Use is made of the 2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey (EB64.1), which is the most recent Europe-wide survey on mobility intentions and includes samples from all – both old and new – Member States.

In 2006, Vandenbrande et al outlined the first descriptive results of this mobility survey in the *Mobility in Europe* report – a study which was also commissioned by the Foundation. The descriptive report provides the framework for this research report which, however, focuses on more analytical measures, tools and methods, shifting from bivariate to more advanced multivariate analyses. Although the basic research questions guiding this report require complex analyses, efforts will be made to communicate the main findings in a way that will help to enhance the rationale of the current policy and societal debate on assumed consequences of migration trends in Europe.

1 Research framework

Decision to migrate

There is quite a large body of theoretical and empirical socioeconomic literature on migration. Generally speaking, in its most simple form the migration decision can be stated as follows: an individual will migrate from the current location A to region or country B, if the expected utility of moving to B is higher than the expected utility from staying in A, net of migration costs. This means that an individual will migrate to B if:

$$U_{iA}(E_{iA}, D_{iA}, S_{iA}, M_A) < U_{iB}(E_{iB}, D_{iB}, S_{iB}, M_B) - C_{iA \to B}(f, d_i, c_i) \quad [1]$$

where **U**i. represents utility of the individual **i** in **A** or **B**, which depends on socioeconomic attributes **E**i., such as the labour market status, the level of human capital; demographic attributes **D**i., such as the household composition; social and cultural attributes **S**i., such as social ties or language; and how these attributes are valued in **A** and **B**, respectively. Utility also depends on macroeconomic and societal characteristics that are valued by the individual **M**, such as the general labour market and economic situation. **C** represents the costs to migration for the individual **i**. These expenditures consist of out-of-pocket costs equal to all costs (**f**) related to the distance of the move (**d**), and psycho-cultural costs (**c**) that are specific for each individual.

Holding everything constant, the individual **i** will migrate if he or she expects a higher utility elsewhere, net of cost for relocation. Henceforth, the migration decision is a positive function of expected utility in the destination country, a negative function of expected utility in the home country, and a negative function of migration costs. The expected pay-off of migration, as **[1]** illustrates, depends on individual- and location-specific characteristics. This is because such characteristics either affect utility directly, or because they affect the cost of mobility.

Factors determining migration

Migration literature specifies several factors that are likely to affect the decision to move. These can be classified into *micro determinants* (individual level) and *macro determinants* (aggregate; **M** in equation **[1]**) of migration. This section briefly discusses these two sets of determinants.

Micro determinants

Economic self-improvement ranks among the most influential individual-level determinants of the choice to migrate. Pull factors include the immediate employment and wage opportunities in the host country (Harris and Todaro, 1970); even more important may be the *expected* wage and employment prospects, as stated in Sjaastad's human capital theory of migration (Sjaastad, 1962). The migration decision is thus driven by the perceived earnings growth in the host country (Chiswick, 1978). Economic pull factors also involve social security benefits in the host country, so-called 'welfare magnets' (Borjas, 1999). Furthermore, the housing market in the receiving country represents a decisive migration factor as well, in particular, greater availability of houses and living space at lower prices. Accordingly, the lack of available affordable housing in the home country or region can then be seen as a major push factor (OECD, 2005).

The presence, accessibility and vitality of solid social networks in the destination country are also of crucial importance (Massey et al, 1993; Massey et al, 1994; Zavodny, 1997; Hatton and Williamson, 2002; Ecorys, 2006). Such social networks create the transferability of social capital to incoming migrants and yield a better circulation of necessary information, which fosters mobility (Massey et al, 1994). Such network effects can result in either benefits (positive externality) or costs (negative externality) for the host country and its citizens (Massey et al, 1993). Positive externalities imply that the utility of the migrant will be larger in the host country, when social networks of peers are well-developed and maintained. Negative externalities imply that the concentration of non-nationals has negative effects on the utility of nationals, due to increased competition for example.

Migration decisions are often related to demographic events as well, such as separation from one's partner. Additionally, the migration literature clearly points to the fact that migration is often primarily a household choice, and not just an individual decision. In economic terms, a household will only migrate when utility gains of some of the household members exceed the utility loss of other household members (Mincer, 1978). Furthermore, authors have also pointed out that migration can be seen as risk-sharing behaviour (Stark, 1991). In this context, the household – rather than the individual alone – is making the migration decision in order to maximise household income while minimising the labour markets risks for the household.

A further interesting finding is that future mobility is also affected by past mobility, in other words, movers tend to stay movers (Vandenbrande et al, 2006; Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004). Past mobility is likely to reduce the total cost of future mobility, because it lowers the psychological cost of mobility, as well as its actual cost, due to the availability of better information. An interesting hypothesis to be tested is whether the reason – labour-related or socio-demographic – for which people moved in the past matters or not.

Macro determinants

At the macro level, the migration literature suggests a number of socioeconomic determinants surrounding the decision to migrate.[3] At the most general level, these determinants include the current labour market situation in the home country: lack of employment opportunities, or too low earnings in the home country, act as incentives for migration. Moreover, the GDP – more specifically, a low level of wealth in the country of residence – is also a migration stimulus. However, it should be added that the functional form for the effect of GDP on migration is not straightforward. As discussed by Pedersen et al (2004), the relationship is not necessarily linear, but could also come in the form of an inverted U-shape. At low levels of wealth, emigration (nationals leaving the country) is limited because people lack financial possibilities to finance their migration. As income levels rise, emigration increases. Then at high levels of wealth, emigration is less probable due to lack of pressing economic incentives to migrate (Hatton and Williamson, 2002). Pedersen et al (2004), however, were not able to empirically verify this inverted-U relationship.

Furthermore, the taxation regime such as excessive taxation and important fiscal burden may operate as an incentive to migrate. This will be especially true for highly-skilled workers who seek to maximise their net gains by moving to regions with lower taxation.

The next central topic to be looked at is the issue of self-selection in migration processes. This issue is much debated in migration literature – both in theoretical and empirical models – and points to the possible sorting effect of migration due to self-selection of migrants. In a seminal paper, Borjas (1987) argues that different locations are characterised by different employment opportunities, as well as different income generating processes. These differences are due to location-specific returns to skills. Borjas shows that if the wage generating process in the sending and host country are similar, a strong positive correlation therefore exists between the expected wage of the migrant in the home and host country,[4] differences in the variance in the wage distribution will explain the sorting effect of migration. Self-selection is positive, if the wage distribution in the host country is more unequal than in the home country. Such an environment is an incentive for highly-skilled individuals to migrate, for their home country taxes skills relatively more than the host country does. There is negative self-selection, if the wage dispersion in the home country is larger than in the host country. On this basis, low-skilled migration is likely to take place since the host country 'insures' low wages. The

[3] This overview does not explore non-economic and non-voluntary macro push factors to migrate, such as massive persecution, wars or devastating natural disasters like earthquakes or tsunamis, however important they are.

[4] A relationship that assumes international recognition of skills.

predictions from the Borjas model have been tested empirically in the literature. Overall, support is found for the positive selection hypothesis while the negative selection hypothesis is refuted (Chiquiar and Hanson, 2002). However, Borjas' model clearly illustrates the need to control for differences in inequality, alongside differences in average income.

Expectations regarding migration

This section explores a number of expectations with regard to the migration decision. Moreoever, it explains in what way these expectations relate to the parameters in the equation [1] specified above. The expectations concern the effect of the following factors: economic (*E*); demographic (*D*); social (*S*); macroeconomic (*M*) and of the cost characteristics (*C*) of migration. These expectations will be tested in the subsequent sections of this report. Outlining these expectations is important for structuring the empirical analyses of the Eurobarometer mobility survey data in the following sections. It is also important to outline these expectations because they relate to the very heart of the current policy and societal debate on expected migration trends in Europe in terms of which Europeans are likely to move and why.

People are more likely to express an intention to migrate, if the expected returns on migration are substantial, e.g. when their human capital is more valued in the destination country than in the home country (parameter E in [1]). Typically, this is the case for higher educated individuals. However, as suggested by the Borjas model, whether higher or lower educated individuals will migrate depends on the level of inequality in the home country compared with that of the host country (parameter *M* in [1]). If inequality is relatively low in the home country, the higher educated individuals will be more likely to migrate than less well educated individuals. But if inequality is relatively high, lower educated individuals will be more likely to migrate.

In general, young people are expected to have stronger migration intentions than older people for at least four reasons. Firstly, youth generally has a higher level of human capital than people from older cohorts (parameter *E* in [1]). Secondly, the pay-back period for the migration costs incurred is longer, making it more likely that their evaluation of the net returns on migration will be positive (*U*-*C* in [1]). Thirdly, young people have accumulated a lower stock of social capital, which lowers the psychosocial cost of mobility (parameter c_i in [1]). Fourthly, younger people are at a stage of their lives when they experience greater degrees of personal freedom and their life course is less crystallised. In other words, they are less bound by family ties and new environments are important to them. Thus, the likely more pronounced migration intention among younger cohorts is a combination of a human capital explanation, and a life course or cultural hypothesis.

Demographic characteristics such as the presence of a partner or children are also expected to affect the migration decision in a significant way (parameter D_{iA} in [1]). Individuals, free from partner ties, can make their decision to move in a more independent and autonomous way. This is not the case for couples since the individual decision to move has direct implications for the other household members. This is even more so the case when children are involved. Couples with children are therefore expected to report a lower predisposition to migrate.

Another factor that is assumed to influence the intention to move is the individual's history of past mobility. People who have frequently moved have developed social networks in several geographical locations (parameters S_{iA} and S_{iB} in [1]). They know how to build and maintain social networks. For these people, the psychosocial costs of mobility are likely to be lower (parameter c_i in [1]). Besides, they have better information – based on personal experience – concerning the various cost-aspects of migration, and are consequently better able to evaluate the costs and benefits of mobility.

However, it appears that the reason for past mobility also represents an important factor. People who moved for demographic reasons, such as marriage, have invested in long -term relationships. They have increased their stock of social capital in the current place of residence, which makes them less likely to move again in the future (parameter S_{iA}

in [1]). On the contrary, people who moved for job-related reasons are not primarily investing in long-term relationships. They are more aware of their employment opportunities, and how to optimise work and income conditions. If better opportunities arise, they may change employers again. Therefore, people who moved for work-related reasons are more likely expected to express the intention to move again, while people who moved for demographic or family reasons are less likely to express such intentions.

Personal views regarding mobility and expectation, with respect to the potential effects of mobility, are likely to be important determinants too. People viewing mobility positively are expected to have a higher inclination to move than people who hold negative views on mobility. This is due the psychosocial cost of mobility being lower for the latter group (parameter c_i in [1]). In relation to the general views on mobility, the way people perceive the potential costs and benefits of mobility will also determine their tendency to move. If people expect negative effects on their employment or income position, they will have a lower intention to move (parameter E_{iB} in [1]). By the same token, if people expect negative effects from migration for their social networks, they will be less inclined to migrate, because moving would entail a reduction of their social ties (parameter S_{iB} in [1]) and because of the high psychosocial costs of mobility (parameter c_i in [1]).

Many studies have shown that a poor macroeconomic situation is an important push-factor for mobility. It is therefore expected that mobility intentions in countries with poor economic performance will be greater than migration intentions in countries that offer good economic prospects (parameter M in [1]).

Finally, migration intentions are expected to be stronger if the distance between home and destination country is not so great. Naturally, the costs of mobility are lower when it involves moving over a short, rather than over a long distance (parameter d_i in [1]).

To summarise, migration intentions among European citizens are expected to be higher if one of the following conditions occurs:

5. expected returns are high (higher educated individuals);
6. pay-back period for costs is long (youth);
7. one has no partner (single);
8. one has no children;
9. one has favourable views on mobility;
10. one has experience of mobility in the past;
11. past mobility was job-related rather than family-related;
12. one does not perceive negative effects for employment;
13. one does not expect negative effects for social ties;
14. economic prospects in home country are bad;
15. when wage inequality in the home country is low (higher educated individuals);
16. the migration distance is relatively short.

This study aims to provide empirical answers to these expected micro and macro factors influencing Europeans' migration intentions, including migration reasons, migration attitudes, migration past, demographic features, economic prospects and migration distance. It also aims to highlight possible differences in this respect between the 25 European countries. This will add to a better understanding why Europeans want to, or indeed *why* they don't want to, migrate. Knowing the main factors that determine the migration intentions of European citizens, for example from the NMS, will provide a better estimate and validation of the migration potential in distinct European states. Migration policy, after all, will clearly benefit from an accurate understanding of the mobility potential among European citizens.

Data and model analysis 2

Description of Eurobarometer mobility survey dataset

The findings presented in this study are based on analyses of a special module of the Eurobarometer survey, the mobility survey in 2005 (EB 64.1). The survey was funded by the European Commission and data were collected in all EU25 countries in September 2005; the study was conducted in close cooperation with the Foundation (Vandenbrande et al, 2006; Karpinnen et al, 2006; Krieger, 2006).[5]

The 2005 mobility survey is the most recent and most comprehensive survey on mobility intentions and attitudes, with samples from all EU countries, covering EU15, NMS and the then acceding countries, Bulgaria and Romania, and the candidate country, Turkey. In total, about 24,500 persons, aged 15 years and over, were surveyed across these countries. The basic sample design applied in all states was a multi-stage, random (probability) one. In each country, a number of sampling points were drawn, with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) and to population density. TNS Opinion and Social conducted the interviews in the autumn of 2005. In the EU25 countries, the survey covers the national population of citizens of the respective nationalities and the population of citizens of all the EU Member States that are residents in those countries and have a sufficient command of one of the respective national language(s) to answer the questionnaire. Face-to-face interviews were carried out in the appropriate national language. As far as the data capture was concerned, CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) was used in those countries were this technique was available.

In each country, some 1,000 respondents were interviewed; in small countries, such as Luxembourg and Malta, only 500 people were interviewed. The samples for west and east Germany were merged, so 1,500 persons altogether were surveyed in Germany. The samples for Great Britain and Northern Ireland were also merged, resulting in some 1,300 persons interviewed for the UK. When weighted, the data are representative of the national population. The analyses presented in this report cover the age groups from 18 years to 64 years.

The Eurobarometer mobility survey covers a number of issues related to both geographical and labour market mobility in Europe: short and long distance mobility; past and future mobility; motives for, and effects of past and future mobility; mobility intentions (within and between countries); and encouraging and discouraging factors to move within and outside of the EU.

In this analysis, the main (dependent) variable of interest pertains to mobility intentions for the next five years. The relevant survey question was phrased as follows:

> ‘Do you think that in the next five years you are likely to move:
>
> (1) in the same city/town/village;
>
> (2) to another city/town/village, but in the same region;
>
> (3) to another region, but in the same country;
>
> (4) to another country in the European Union;
>
> (5) to another country outside the European Union;
>
> (6) you don’t think you will move.’

[5] For further information on recent migration trend studies by the Foundation, see **http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/migration.htm**.

More than one answer could be given to the question. The total number of respondents (aged 18–64 years) that expressed their mobility intention amounted to 17,493 persons.[6]

The Eurobarometer mobility survey dataset includes relevant background information on: the respondent (gender, age and educational level); the household (marital status, children); labour market status (whether unemployed or working, occupational status); and labour market experience (age at first job, number of jobs in the past). The data also contain relevant information on respondents' past geographic mobility. It has to be stressed that the main disadvantage of this special mobility module of the 2005 Eurobarometer survey, is that it omits information on the location or country people intended to move to, and on the intended duration of the stay in the destination country.

Use of migration intentions data

How reliable are data on migration intentions? The decision to move is a complex, multi-faceted choice. This is, of course, particularly true when long distances and/or cross-border moves are involved, generating a complete change of social environment and deeply impact on an individual's life course. Such a move 'often involves a loss of established social networks of family and friends, and the challenge of integration into a new job, a different social security system and a new social environment, often with the need to learn a new language' (Krieger, 2006, p. 2). Merely measuring the intention to move as a sole indicator of the act to move ignores the complexity of the move decision process. Many desiderata, possibilities, constraints and consequences have to be taken into consideration. These are very likely to mediate the relationships between the intention to move and the act of moving. It is known from psychological decision and attitude theory that behavioural intentions – as general predispositions – predict actual behaviour only under certain conditions. Moreover, the intention to act is a function of many factors. One of the most traditional approaches is the well-known theory of reasoned action by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). It assumes that the behaviour to act depends on the intention to perform that behaviour, which in turn is a function of two factors: the attitude toward that behaviour (A act) and the subjective norms with respect to performing that behaviour (SN). In turn, A is a function of beliefs about the consequences of performing that behaviour (B_i), and includes one's evaluations of those consequences (E_i). Whereas SN is a function of beliefs about normative consequences with respect to the behaviour (NB_i) and one's motivation to comply with those expectations (MCi); expressed by the following mathematical formula:

$$B \sim BI = \left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} B_1 E_1\right] w_1 + \left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} NB_i MC_i\right] w_2 \qquad [2]$$

where:

B = overt behaviour

BI = behavioural intention

B_i = beliefs about consequences

E_i = evaluation of consequences

NB_i = normative beliefs

MC_i = motivation to comply with normative beliefs

W_1 and W_2 = standardised (beta) weights to be determined by regression analysis

When applying this theory to the subject of mobility, the following conditions apply: the intention to move is a function of the attitude towards moving combined with existing subjective norms towards moving; the attitude towards moving is a function of beliefs about the (positive and negative) consequences of moving and the evaluations of these consequences; the subjective norm towards moving is a function of the normative (positive and negative) beliefs about moving and one's motivation to comply with those beliefs. But a world of intervening factors, such as individual skills, alternative behaviours, situational constraints and institutional barriers may come between the intention to move and the actual move.

This short contemplation of determinants of behavioural intentions and of the relationship between intention and actual behaviour shows that the intention to move is a complex decision, and that a pro-move intention is not a perfect predictor of actual moving. Therefore, the respondents' answers to direct survey questions on the intention to move have to be interpreted with caution. This is particularly the case when assessing the actual moving potential, and most notably when long-distance cross-border moves are concerned. However, the Eurobarometer mobility survey data offers quite a variety to measure possible determinants of the intention to move, which enables a (more) balanced interpretation of mobility intentions.

As Manski (1990) also shows, the intentions do, under certain circumstances, have a predictive value for future behaviour. Many migration studies make use of (balanced) mobility intention measures, for example Tidrick (1971), Finifter (1976) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) for the US; Burda et al (1998) for Germany; Faini et al (1997) for Italy, Ahn et al (1999) for Spain, Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004) in an international comparative survey, and Krieger (2004) for acceding and candidate EU countries. This analysis is based on the assumption that intentions are a monotonic function of the true (unobserved) future behaviour. This assumption is supported by findings of Böheim and Taylor (2002) and Gordon and Molho (1995). Using panel data for Britain, Böheim and Taylor (2002) show that the actual probability to move within Britain is three times higher for people who expressed a preference for moving, than for people who did not express such a preference. Gordon and Molho (1995) report on available evidence from a 1980 British survey on actual and potential migration, which suggests that at least 90% of people who expressed an intent to migrate, did indeed do so within five years.

Using balanced migration intention data has three specific advantages. Firstly, in migration models it is not migration itself that is the issue, but often migration incentives. It is typically the sheer potential for mobility that explains why some countries establish barriers to migration and not mobility itself. Secondly, migration intentions data are gathered in the sending country. This is an advantage compared to host-country migration data because intention data are not biased due to self-selection effects (see also Liebig and Sousa-Poza, 2004). Thirdly, the policy relevance of examining migration intentions, as well as the factors influencing these intentions, is undisputed and self-evident, with future cross-border migration flows remaining high on the EU policy agenda, both at the level of the European Commission and of the individual Member States.

3 Descriptive results

Cross-border migration intentions in Europe

Migration intentions by country

The first descriptive data to be presented are on the long-distance cross-border migration intentions of Europeans. In order to determine whether such intentions reflect trend sensitivity, results from previous studies will be included as well. By doing so, one gets a rough indication of what the main European developments regarding between-country migration intentions in the last decade are. These indications are of obvious policy relevance. The question is are Europeans, especially those from new Member States, thinking more and more about moving to another European or non-European country. And in particular, are they thinking about moving to one of the old Member States? If so, are these significant trends and substantial proportions of people? And are there marked differences between countries?

As findings on migration intentions very much depend on the actual wording of questions, the various measurements will have to be carefully compared. Table 1 reports on migration intentions in Europe on the basis of the 2005 Eurobarometer (EB) mobility survey (last column). The numbers refer to Europeans' readiness to move to another country, either within or outside the EU, within the next five years. For the purpose of comparison, the table also includes similar data based on previous versions of the Eurobarometer survey, notably data gathered in 2001–2002 (third column). Moreover, a report on migration intentions from another source is included: the 1995 wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP).[7] Although the questions in the various Eurobarometer surveys are similar in essence, they are not exactly the same. The ISSP question, however, is rather different as it asks, 'would you be willing to move to another country to improve your work or living conditions?' People can respond on a 5-point Likert scale, with answers ranging from 'very unwilling' (coded 0) to 'very willing' (coded 4) (see Annex 1 for exact wording of survey questions). Hence, the results presented in Table 1 are not fully comparable. The first column refers to the proportion of people who are very willing to move to another country in order to improve their work or living conditions. The second column reports the average inclination to migrate as measured by the mean of the Likert scale per country.

Overall, the mobility intentions as measured in ISSP ('very willing') are significantly larger than those measured in the Eurobarometer surveys. This is very likely due to the different wording of the questions. The Eurobarometer asks for mobility intentions in general, while ISSP asks for the readiness to move in order to improve one's work or living conditions. Stated this way, ISSP implies a possible positive outcome of migration in the question, while the Eurobarometer does not. As a result, when compared to ISSP, the readiness to move is likely to be relatively weaker in the Eurobarometer surveys. It is our contention that the migration intentions, as measured in the Eurobarometer, are a better measure, for these surveys do not relate the intentions to the possible positive effect(s).

Overall 5.4% of EU citizens intend to move to another country within the next five years. However, Table 1 also indicates that the magnitude of intended migration in Europe in 2005 is very diverse: Europe is far from homogenous in terms of national migration readiness. Migration intentions are clearly country-specific. Intentions to migrate within the next five years are particularly high in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland and Poland – and relatively low in quite dissimilar countries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Hungary and Spain (see also Vandenbrande et al, 2006). The difference in mobility intentions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland compared to the other NMS is striking. However, can these intentions be taken at face value? Based on previous waves of the Eurobarometer, Krieger (2004) has suggested that the proportion of people with a firm intention to migrate is in reality a third of those expressing

[7] For further details on ISSP, see **http://www.issp.org/data.htm**.

a general inclination to migrate. This would mean that between 2.4% and 4.2% of the residents of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland firmly intend to migrate (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2006). Such intentions are significantly lower in the other NMS. Whether migration intentions are realistic can also be assessed from econometric studies. Using advanced econometric methods, and applying migration streams at the time of the EU accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to a number of accessing and candidate countries, Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) report expected long-term migration ranging from 0.2% for Slovenia, 6% for Poland, and up to almost 28% for Romania, in the case of unrestricted migration.[8] The authors, however, urge caution when considering such simulations, and maintain that 'it is reasonable to expect long-run emigration rates from the east to the west of between 2% and 3% of the population in the sending region' (Bauer and Zimmermann, 1999, p. 46).

Because the questions underlying the data in Table 1 are not comparable, rank order correlations have been computed. This was done to see whether or not there is some consistency in the order of countries across sources. The rank correlation in migration intentions between the two ISSP measures is high (0.82), and significant (at the 5% level). The correlation between the ISSP measures and the EB 2001–2002 data is lower (around 0.49; and only significant at the 10% level). The correlation between the ISSP and the EB 2005 measure is low (0.18), and not significant. The correlation between the EB 2001–2002 and EB 2005 measures is significant at a value of 0.73. This low correlation between 1995 and 2005 mobility intentions points to fundamental changes in the readiness to move across Europe. On the one hand, the migration intentions in Italy and Spain are relatively large in the ISSP, but relatively low in the 2005 Eurobarometer. On the other hand, as was illustrated in the overall descriptive report on the EB 2005 mobility data, using a difference-in-differences approach to control for changes in the questionnaire, mobility intentions have increased relatively more in some of the then acceding countries (especially Poland and Lithuania), when compared to other European countries (Vandenbrande et al 2006). This approach will be looked at, when analysing migration intentions for different educational categories (between the two EB waves).

Table 1: *Migration intentions in EU25 and other countries, 1995–2005 (%)*

	ISSP		**Eurobarometer**	
	1995 (% very willing)	**1995** (mean)	**2001–2002** (%)	**2005** (%)
EU15				
AT	4.8	0.7	2.7	3.3
BE			3.6	4.8
DE	8.6	1.3	0.8	3.5
DK			5.6	8.7
EL			1.0	4.3
ES	11.4	1.3	1.1	30
FI			5.7	6.0
FR			5.2	6.2
IE	9.8	1.0	5.8	10.4
IT	10.2	1.1	5.8	10.4
LU			5.7	6.5
NL	9.9	1.5	4.7	5.3
PT			0.2	4.9
SE	14.1	1.6	7.4	7.5
UK	11.1	1.4	5.2	7.9

[8] This study covers Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, Romania.

Table 1: *Migration intentions in EU25 and other countries, 1995–2005 (%) (cont'd)*

	ISSP		Eurobarometer	
	1995 (% very willing)	**1995** (mean)	**2001–2002** (%)	**2005** (%)
NMS				
CY			2.9	4.2
CZ	3.9	07	1.7	1.4
EE			2.8	9.7
HU	3.2	0.7	1.3	3.0
LT			4.9	13.1
LV	3.4	0.8	3.2	9.6
MT			0.4	8.0
PL	9.6	1.3	2.5	9.9
SI	3.9	0.9	1.5	4.1
SK	10.2	1.3	3.3	5.4
EU25			**2.9**	**5.4**
AC2				
Bulgaria	12.8	1.6	7.3	
Romania			3.8	
Candidate country				
Turkey			1.4	
Other countries				
Canada	12.0	1.5		
New Zealand	7.8	1.5		
US	7.4	1.0		
Norway	5.6	1.3		
Russia	4.0	0.8		
Japan	2.1	0.7		
Philippines	9.4	1.6		

Note: *People intending to move to another country within or outside the EU.*

Migration intentions and human capital

A breakdown of mobility intentions by gender, age, educational level and household type is presented in Figure 1. According to the literature, human capital is likely to play an important role in explaining migration (Sjastaad, 1962; OECD, 2001). The standard prediction from migration theory (see Massey et al, 1993) of the typical migrant being young, higher educated, single and male is confirmed by EB data. More than 6% of European men report an intention to move across borders while only 4% of European women express the same intention. Higher educated people (6.6%), and especially students (almost 17%), indicate a greater level of between-country migration tendencies. Single people, and to a lesser extent single parents, also express the intention to migrate to another country, more often than is average. The readiness to migrate can be seen clearly among the youngest cohort of Europeans. It is not clear from these cross-sectional data – although it is of obvious importance – whether this reflects an age, a cohort or even a period effect. In any case, migration intentions are most pronounced among young Europeans with relatively more human capital, and fewer household ties. The intention to migrate to another country, within or outside the EU, is not exclusively a feature of socially or economically deprived Europeans. On the contrary, one needs the right resources, to be at the right age,

and to be at a particular life course stage. Additionally, the right mind-set is important when considering such a far-reaching step, as migrating to another country is.

Figure 1: *Migration intentions by gender, educational level, age, and household type (%)*



Increasing mobility intentions in new Member States

To assess mobility intentions according to the highest educational level attained by the respondent, the difference-in-differences methodology, mentioned above, is applied in Table 2. Findings show that mobility intentions have particularly increased for students (respondents still studying) in the NMS. This is evident when compared to the mobility intentions of students in the EU15. Most likely, this results from the enhanced awareness and sensitivity of this specific group for the need to 'go international', combined with the effort of the EU to promote the cross-border mobility of students, for example through the Erasmus and Socrates programmes (Vandenbrande et al 2006, Chapter 2).[9]

[9] Note, however, that students represent a relatively small group in the total population sample.

Mobility intentions of the higher educated have also increased. People in this category in the NMS are five times more likely to express mobility intentions than those in the EU15. In the Eurobarometer, the educational attainment is measured by the age at which one finishes full-time education. For ease of exposition in this report, this measure has been recoded into three levels: those who stopped their education before the age of 16 qualify as 'lower educated'; those who finished full-time education between the age of 16 and 19 are said to have an 'average educational level'; people who left full-time education at the age of 20 years or above are considered as 'higher educated'. Students from the NMS seem to have grasped quite clearly that in order to further advance their education and career – in short, their human capital – going west is a very promising option. In all, only 15% of the people in the NMS who express a migration intention have no intention to migrate within Europe.

Table 2: *Migration intentions in Europe by educational level, difference-in-differences for the comparison of two EB waves, 2001 and 2005 (%)*

	EU15			NMS			Difference-in-differences
	EB 2001	EB 2005	Difference	EB 2002	EB 2005	Difference	
Lower educated	1.1	2.1	1.0	0.6	2.1	1.5	0.5
Average educational level	2.4	3.9	1.5	1.5	4.4	2.9	1.4
Higher educated	4.4	6.1	1.7	3.4	9.8	6.4	4.7
Still studying	11.6	14.7	3.1	7.3	23.8	16.4	13.3
Total	3.2	5.0	1.8	2.3	7.4	5.1	3.3

The observed relative rise in migration intentions among citizens of the NMS highlights the policy relevance of systematically tapping migration intentions in Europe. It reveals a possible brain drain within Europe and more specifically from the NMS, in particular from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to the EU15. It is not yet clear whether such intended new to old Member State moves are maybe the first part of a mobility stepping-stone effect with other nations (e.g. the US) as the final destination.

Migration intentions and economic context

According to the literature discussed, migration is expected to be driven – at least partly – by the general macroeconomic context. Poor economic opportunities and prospects could serve as direct or indirect incentives to migrate. But exactly how macroeconomic features shape and reinforce the decision to move, and how the causal links between the two operate, is still not very well understood and open to multiple interpretations. To further elaborate and illustrate the relationships between macroeconomic conditions and migration readiness, correlations are presented between migration intentions and GDP per head, GDP growth rate, and the rate of long-term unemployment for all 25 EU Member States.

Findings presented in Figure 2 show a clear U-shaped relationship between migration intentions and GDP: the inclination to migrate to another country is highest at both relatively low and relatively high GDP levels. A similar relationship is found with the GDP growth rate as denoted in Figure 3. This result matches with the outcome obtained by Pedersen et al (2004), but contrasts with an inverted U-relationship which Hatton and Williamson (2002) would expect. No clear relationship, however, is found with respect to the rate of long-term unemployment (see Figure 4). The macro unemployment level is not directly related to migration tendencies. It can be concluded that the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and migration intention is not linear. Both very unfavourable and very favourable wealth levels function as stimuli for migration readiness, albeit for very different reasons.

Figure 2: *Relationship between intentions to migrate and GDP per head, 2004 (EU25=100)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Figure 3: *Relationship between intentions to migrate and GDP growth rate, 2004*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Figure 4: *Relationship between intentions to migrate and long-term unemployment rate, 2004*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

As outlined in Chapter 1, migration theory has come up with quite clear hypotheses with respect to the effect of income inequality on migration (see Borjas 1987; 1994). These include negative self-selection (greater income inequality in home country than in host country) and positive self-selection (greater income inequality in host country than in home country). However, with only the current data at hand, these predictions can not be confirmed. As is indicated by theee findings presented in Figure 5, migration intentions of the lower educated do not seem to be responsive to income inequality.[10] For the higher educated the relationship is positive (see Figure 6), with lower mobility intentions at low levels of income inequality and higher intentions as inequality increases. In short, neither the negative selection hypothesis nor the positive selection hypothesis could be confirmed. It needs to be stressed, though, that these results do not signify a 'hard' test of the Borjas hypotheses. Such a test would require controlling for differences in relative inequality between the home and the host country. As mentioned above, information about the host country is, unfortunately, not included in the Eurobarometer mobility survey.

[10] For a similar finding, see Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004).

Figure 5: *Relationship between intentions to migrate and income inequality, lower educated*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Figure 6: *Relationship between intentions to migrate and income inequality, higher educated*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Migration intentions in new Member States

When compared to old Member States, migration intentions in 2005 are higher among the NMS (see Table 2). These intentions have been on the rise since the beginning of this century. Such findings warrant a further exploration of the pro-migration groups in both clusters of EU countries. Do the two groups share the same characteristics, or it is the case that their demographic make-up is quite different? Table 3 describes the composition of the group of respondents from the EU15 countries and from the NMS who explicitly express the intention to migrate in the next five years. Because of the large observed differences in mobility intentions among the latter group of countries, the data presented concern the four countries with high mobility intentions (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) and the remaining countries with low mobility intentions.

Results reveal that respondents from NMS with high or low/moderate migration intentions are on average younger than their EU15 counterparts. Quite interestingly, about one-fifth of pro-migration respondents from the old Member States are over 45 years of age. People with an explicit migration intention from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are typically better educated than their counterparts from the other NMS but slightly less so than the pro-migration EU15 respondents. The main difference here, however, is the large number of students in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, who want to migrate. This shows that this cohort of young people – as observed earlier – are well aware of the labour market and income opportunities abroad. For them migration is a very viable and real option. In the EU15 and the NMS showing low/moderate mobility intentions, a large number of the potential migrants are single; however, in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland quite the opposite is true. Finally, outcomes illustrate that typically those in the old Member States intending to migrate are likely to already be employed while in the NMS, a larger number are unemployed. This is especially evident in countries with low or moderate migration intentions.

Table 3: *Composition of pro-migration group, NMS vs. EU15 (%)*

	EU15	NMS with low/moderate migration intentions[1]	NMS high migration intentions[2]
Educational level			
Lower	8	6	2
Average	34	44	32
Higher	35	25	30
Still studying	23	25	36
Total	100	100	100
Age			
18–24 years	31	38	38
25–34 years	30	35	37
35–44 years	17	13	17
45–54 years	13	5	6
55–64 years	9	8	2
Total	100	100	100
Household type			
Couple (no child)	30	20	33
Couple (with child)	17	17	21
Single person	41	47	30
Single parent	4	10	6
Divorced/separated	7	5	8
Widowed	2	1	3
Total	100	100	100
Employment status			
Working	77	50	54
Unemployed	14	37	26
Retired	5	6	8
Housewife/man	4	7	11
Total	100	100	100

Note: 1) *Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta;* 2) *Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia.*
Source: *Eurobarometer mobility survey data, 2005*

Analysis of long-distance mobility intentions 4

Given its focus on European policy relevance, this study primarily aims to model the determinants of long distance (cross-border) geographic mobility. The migration intentions of individual *i* (y_i) are assessed by the EB mobility question discussed in the first section of Chapter 2. In answering this question, people had the option to report various mobility intentions at the same time. To model migration intentions in this chapter, a dummy variable has been established that takes the value **1** if the individual reports an intention to move to another country (within the EU or outside the EU) within the next five years, and coded **0** if the respondent has no moving intentions at all. Therefore, people reporting moving intentions other than across border have been excluded from the analysis, since including these people in the reference category would wrongly assume that they have no moving intentions at all. A logit model is estimated for reporting an intention to move across the border, as stated in the following equation (Greene, 2000):

$$P(y_i = 1) = \frac{\exp(x_i\beta)}{1 - \exp(x_i\beta)} \qquad [3]$$

with **x** being a vector of covariates, and ***ß*** parameters to be estimated. As discussed above (see equation [1]), **x** includes characteristics measured at the individual and at the macro level. Because the macro level characteristics are allocated to all individuals within the same country, the assumption of independent observations is violated when estimating the parameters for these variables. This results in biased variance of the macro parameters. This violation problem is solved by using the Huber/White sandwich estimator of variance (Huber, 1967; White, 1980).

Characteristics affecting cross-border mobility

The estimates from the logit model for migration intentions presented in equation [2] are displayed in Table 4.[11] The model includes measures of:

17. human capital (a dummy variable for females, educational level, age);
18. current employment status;
19. household composition;
20. housing tenure status;
21. country dummies;
22. overall view on cross-border mobility, computed as a sum of the answers to the five questions on whether people think mobility is a good thing for individuals, their family, the economy, the labour market, and for European integration. Answers were coded **0** if the respondent is indifferent, **-1** if they think it is a bad thing and 1 if they think it is a good thing;
23. past experience with geographical mobility, measured in two ways: 1) in terms of the longest move ever made since one left the parental home; and 2) whether or not the respondent is a foreigner (other nationality than that of the country one currently lives in);

[11] As well as the other tables in this report Table 4 reports the parameter estimates, their significance, and the marginal effects. The marginal effects are computed at the mean and expressed in percentage figures. They should be read as follows: the probability of reporting a migration intention equals 2.9% (last row of coefficients in Table 4). Compared to males, the probability that a female expresses an intention to migrate is 1.2 percentage points lower.

24. reason for last long distance mobility, whether the last long distance move was employment, family or housing related;

25. perceived effects of cross-border mobility. Whether people expect loss of social contacts, loss of employment opportunities, language or cultural barriers, or worse housing or public facilities.

The model confirms the bi-variate findings from the previous section: with regard to migration intentions, the age of the person and their educational level are both very strong determinants. Young people are much more likely to migrate than older people, and so are higher educated individuals and students compared to people with an average or low educational level. This confirms the expectations of high returns on migration (expectation 1) and a long payback period for costs (expectation 2; see section on 'Expectations' in Chapter 1). This finding is important for it shows that young people are a very mobile cohort. They are aware that moving abroad may very well increase their human capital. It is likely that EU policies aimed at encouraging the mobility of higher skilled individuals and of students are contributing to the high level of mobility intentions among these groups.

The model also reveals some important life course effects. As expected, the presence of children in a household reduces the likelihood of mobility (expectation 3). This is probably because, for parents of young children, additional costs in financial and psychosocial terms arise when it comes to migrating. Single people, however, are more likely to migrate, which confirms another expectation of this analysis (expectation 4). For single people, family bonds are weaker, making it psychologically and socially easier to migrate.

Stronger intentions for unemployed persons towards cross-border migration are also observed, compared to employed people. A possible explanation is that for people in employment, the need to migrate is relatively lower, for they already have a secure economic situation. However, this does not necessarily imply that more unemployed than employed people will actually migrate in the (near) future. People in employment – although they less often express an intention to migrate – have more opportunities to actually migrate, simply because they hold a job (migration is selective).

People expressing positive views on cross-border migration are more likely to report a readiness to migrate themselves. An explanation could be that they are more open to, and perhaps also more ready to face new challenges and new experiences in a different country, thus confirming expectation 5.

Table 4: *Logit model estimates for intended migration to another country, coefficients from model and marginal effects*

	Beta coefficient	**Marginal effects (%)**
Female	-0.406**	-1.2
Educational level (reference category: average)		
Lower	-0.158	-0.4
Higher	0.446**	1.4
Still studying	1.296**	6.5
Age (reference category: 35–44 years)		
18–24 years	1.547**	8.4
25–34 years	1.016**	4.0
45–54 years	-0.618**	-1.5
55–64 years	-0.827**	-2.0
Employment status (reference category: employed)		
Unemployed	0.574**	2.0
Retired	-0.109	-0.3
Housewife/man	0.340*	1.1

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 4: *Logit model estimates for intended migration to another country, coefficients from model and marginal effects (cont'd)*

	Beta coefficient	Marginal effects (%)
Household type (reference category: couple, no child)		
Couple (with child)	-0.680**	-1.7
Single person	0.482**	1.6
Single parent	-0.014	0.0
Divorced/separated	0.351*	1.1
Widowed	0.521*	1.8
Homeowner	-0.556**	-1.8
Country dummies (reference country: Belgium)		
EU15		
AT	-0.975**	-1.8
DE	-0.655*	-1.4
DK	0.002	0.0
EL	-0.518	-1.2
ES	-1.232**	-2.1
FI	0.285	0.9
FR	0.177	0.5
IE	0.062	0.2
IT	-0.823**	-1.6
LU	0.013	0.0
NL	0.145	0.4
PT	-0.779*	-1.6
SE	0.474	1.6
UK	0.474	1.6
10 NMS		
CY	-0.200	-0.5
CZ	-1.429**	-2.3
EE	0.742**	2.9
HU	-0.536	-1.2
LT	1.415**	7.6
LV	1.077**	4.9
MT	0.481	1.7
PL	0.702**	2.7
SI	-0.528	-1.2
SK	-0.230	-0.6
View on mobility	0.188**	0.5
Non-nationals	0.005*	0.0
Past mobility (reference category: never moved)		
Within region	0.217	0.6
Across regions	0.504**	1.7
Cross-border	1.472**	7.8

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 4: *Logit model estimates for intended migration to another country, coefficients from model and marginal effects (cont'd)*

	Beta coefficient	Marginal effects (%)
Reason for last long distance move		
Family related	-0.088	-0.2
Job related	0.335*	1.1
Housing related	-0.086	-0.2
Perceived effect of future long distance mobility (fear for …)		
Loss of social networks	-0.318**	-0.9
Loss of job or income	0.070	0.2
Language	-0.351**	-0.9
Housing situation	-0.104	-0.3
Public facilities	-0.070	-0.2
Constant	-3.042**	2.9
N = 13,081; Pseudo R-squared = 0.287		

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Base: *All respondents*

Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Some interesting country effects emerge. Significantly lower tendencies to migrate are found in southern European countries, such as Spain, Italy and Portugal, in Germany and Austria, and in the Czech Republic. Significantly larger migration tendencies are found in four of the 10 NMS, namely Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland. Additional tests have shown that the parameter for Lithuania is significantly larger than that of the three other countries. The estimated parameters given in Table 4 reflect the differences in migration intentions reported in Table 1. It seems that the high mobility intentions in Ireland are apparently due to a composition effect (Table 1).

Past mobility

In addition to those somewhat 'standard' variables, Table 4 also includes additional variables pertaining to long-distance mobility in the past and the expected effects of future migration. Past mobility turns out to be a strong predictor of future intended mobility. This confirms earlier findings, according to which long-distance mobility is not a phenomenon on its own, but part of other geographic transitions people make throughout their lives (Vandenbrande et al, 2006). This conclusion is also illustrated by the effect of past labour market mobility on migration intentions. People who have changed job more often in the past are more likely to report an intention to move abroad (see Table 5).

Past experience with regional or inter-country mobility results in stronger preferences for cross-border migration. The parameters for the effect of age show that, as one gets older, preferences for international mobility decrease and stabilise. However, the effect of past mobility suggests that past experiences reduce possible reservations due to actual practice and better information that one might have against migrating (again) in the future. This confirms expectation 6. Non-nationals therefore display a greater tendency to migrate in the future, but the effect is small. This finding may point at a latent return migration desire among migrants.

The outcomes concerning the main motive for the previous long distance move are interesting,[12] and confirm the expectation that people who moved in the past because of job-related motives are more likely to move again in the future (expectation 7). This is presumably because they are less bound to the place they currently live than people who moved for non-job related reasons, such as family-related reasons.

[12] The reason for the last move is deducted from the answer to the following question: 'The last time you moved to another region or European Union country, what were the main reasons you had for moving?'

Expected effects of mobility

Futhermore, the results show that the expected loss of social contacts, due to migration, fundamentally inhibits the likelihood of migratation (expectation 9).[13] Furthermore, while working-age people do not seem to fear for their job or income position when crossing borders – thereby refuting expectation 8 – they do perceive language barriers to be a significant obstacle, one that could hinder future migration intentions.[14] Finally, the fear of ending up in poor housing conditions or an unfavourable local environment, or indeed even the fear of having poorer public facilities, especially with regard to healthcare facilities, education and public transport, do not appear to affect migration intentions in any significant way.

It should be noted that the dataset also includes a number of questions concerning aspects that would encourage one to move to another country. Because of the high correlation with the factors that discourage people to move, these could not be entered in the estimation model at the same time. Separate analyses, where the discouraging factors were excluded, showed that all factors people say would encourage them to move, such as improved working conditions or income, better housing or local environment and better public facilities, indeed show up to be positive and significant. Positive factors tend to encourage migration intentions for people across the board. Anything that would seemingly improve one's situation, leads to higher migration intentions. Only some factors that worsen a person's situation, such as loss of social contacts and language barriers, lead to lower migration intentions.

Mobility intentions of people in employment

The logit model, presented above, was also estimated for respondents who were employed at the time of the interview. The reason for doing so was to allow into the equation a number of basic variables related to current employment, such as social class, sector of activity or past history of job mobility. Table 5 outlines the findings resulting from these estimates of migration intentions to another country of employed people.

Looking at the effect of the employment-related variables, it can be observed that people from higher social classes are more likely to express migration intentions. This could be put down to the fact that their employment opportunities are generally rather solid.[15] The sector one is working in does not predict much of the migration intentions. The only significant effect is found for people in non-specified sectors, such as 'other' industries. It is therefore difficult to predict the typical profile of the future 'work-migrant' from this model. But it is important in this context to highlight the network effects of migration. Firstly, migrants tend to follow (almost literally) the footsteps of earlier migrants. They will locate to the same geographical area and work in similar occupations. However, as the group of migrants expands and networks develop further, new migrants will take new opportunities. They will spread out to other regions and occupy other jobs (Massey et al, 1994).

[13] These are people who report that 'to miss the support from family or friends' or 'to miss the direct contact with family or friends' would discourage them from moving to another country.

[14] Fear for job or income position is measured in terms of people reporting 'to lose your job or the one of your partner', 'to have a lower household income' or 'worse working conditions', which would discourage them from moving to another country. People who state 'having to learn another language' as a factor that would discourage them from moving to another country are said to fear language barriers.

[15] Social classes in this analysis are established following Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).

Table 5: *Logit model estimates for intended migration to another country of employed people, coefficients from model and marginal effects*

	Beta coefficient	Marginal effects (%)
Female	-0.349**	-0.9
Educational level (reference category: average)		
Lower	-0.035	-0.1
Higher	0.293*	0.7
Age (reference category: 35–44 years)		
18–24 years	1.843**	10.7
25–34 years	0.918**	3.0
45–54 years	-0.456**	-1.0
55–64 years	-0.656**	-1.3
Household type (reference category: couple, no child)		
Couple (with child)	-0.618**	-1.4
Single person	0.625**	1.9
Single parent	-0.075	-0.2
Divorced/separated	0.328	0.9
Widowed	0.297	0.8
Homeowner	-0.572**	-1.7
Country dummies (reference country: Belgium)		
EU15		
AT	-1.268**	-1.9
DE	-0.632	-1.2
DK	-0.034	-0.1
EL	-0.420	-0.9
ES	-0.956*	-1.6
FI	0.030	0.1
FR	-0.014	0.0
IE	-0.097	-0.2
IT	-0.448	-0.9
LU	-0.372	-0.8
NL	0.031	0.1
	-1.268**	-1.9
PT	-0.621	-0.2
SE	0.188	0.5
UK	0.711*	2.4
10 NMS		
CY	-0.487	-1.0
CZ	-1.442*	-2.0
EE	0.636	2.1
HU	-0.608	-1.1
LT	1.517**	7.6
LV	1.047**	4.1
MT	0.832	3.0
PL	0.699	2.3
SI	-0.620	-1.2
SK	-0.440	-0.9

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 5: *Logit model estimates for intended migration to another country of employed people, coefficients from model and marginal effects (cont'd)*

	Beta coefficient	Marginal effects (%)
View on mobility	0.194**	0.5
Non-nationals	0.005	0.0
Past mobility (reference category: never moved)		
Within region	0.146	0.4
Across regions	0.133	0.3
Cross-border	1.235**	5.2
Reason for last long distance move		
Family related	-0.028	-0.1
Job related	0.387*	1.1
Housing related	0.160	0.4
Perceived effect of future long distance mobility (fear for …)		
Loss of social networks	-0.338**	-0.9
Loss of job or income	-0.024	-0.1
Language	-0.400*	-0.9
Housing situation	-0.050	-0.1
Public facilities	-0.159	-0.4
Social class (reference category: intermediate)		
High	0.404**	1.1
Low	-0.249	-0.6
Self-employed/other	-0.011	0.0
Sector of activity (reference category: Industry)		
Agriculture	-0.381	-0.8
Public services	0.058	0.1
Other services	0.143	0.4
Other	0.559**	1.7
Number of job change in the past	0.097**	0.2
Constant	-3.524**	2.5

N = 7,624; Pseudo R-squared = 0.240

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Base: *All employed respondents*

Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Past job mobility of the employed is an important determinant of their migration intentions in the near future. People who have changed jobs quite regularly report stronger migration intentions. This fact illustrates that some people have specific psychological traits that 'make' them 'movers', whether geographically or on the job front. In other words, movers tend to stay movers (cf. Vandenbrande et al, 2006).

Most of the other effects are similar to the ones specified in the previous estimate, although two interesting differences emerge. The age profile, for example, is a lot sharper among the sub-group of working people, which suggests that it is young working people in particular who see appealing opportunities in moving abroad. The second interesting difference is that the greater mobility intentions in Estonia and Poland, which were noted before, now turn out to be insignificant in the sub-group of employed people. In this estimate, the tendency among working people in these two countries to move across borders is not different from most of the other EU countries.

Country-level factors affecting cross-border mobility

GDP level and income inequality

Using the same model specifications as for the estimate of intended migration across countries (based on equation [2] and measures displayed in Table 4), the country dummies were replaced by macro-level variables. The main results are presented in Table 6; the other parameters have been omitted in the table to improve readability. All parameters remained more or less unchanged. Table 6 clearly shows the inverted-U relationship between GDP per head and migration intentions already depicted in Figure 2. This partly confirms expectation 10.

Table 6: *Parameters from model for intended migration to another country, estimates for macro-economic variables in the home country*

	All	All	Higher educated	Average educated	Lower educated
Other coefficients omitted					
GDP per head	-0.029***				
GDP per head^2 / 100	0.011***				
Gini coefficient		0.037	0.041	0.058*	-0.011
Pseudo R-squared	0.253	0.246	0.199	0.175	0.173
N	13,081	12,793	3,619	6,250	2,309

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Base: *All respondents*

Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Mobility intentions do not seem to be significantly related to income inequality in the home country. Only respondents with an average educational level, who live in a country where income inequality is higher, report greater migration intentions. These findings therefore do not provide any evidence of positive selection, or indeed of negative selection, as was suggested by Borjas. This implies that expectation 11 cannot be confirmed.

Other macroeconomic variables in the home country

Other macro-level variables were included in the model, such as the rate of unemployment, rate of long-term unemployment, tax rate on labour, poverty risk rate (all measured in the home country). None of these variables has a significant effect on migration intentions. The proportion of GDP spent on a country's social protection is, however, negatively correlated with migration intentions. This could mean that people see their social welfare system as a kind of risk insurance, one that they are not ready to give up by migrating to another country which does not afford them the same level of social protection.

Distance of migration

So far, it has not been possible to test the last expectation, which pertains to the effect that the distance of migration has on the probability of migration (expectation 12). This is mainly due to the fact that the data, as indicated, cannot provide information on the country of destination the respondent intends to move to. What can be done, however, is to use the information on the probability of mobility over other distances, to approximate the cost of mobility related to the distance (***d*** in equation [1]). In order to do so, it was necessary to define a variable measuring the longest distance

one would be prepared to travel, where there was an intention to move. In light of this, the mobility intention variable (y_i) takes the following values:

0 no migration (if the respondent reports no intention to move within the next five years);

1 local mobility (if the respondent reports no intention to move within the current region as the longest move);

2 regional mobility (if the respondent reports an intention to move to another region within the country);

3 international mobility (if the respondent reports an intention to move to another country, either within or outside the EU).

The variable was modelled in a multinomial framework and the migration probabilities were retrieved. These probabilities were plotted for each of the educational levels in Figure 7. The figure shows that the tendency to move drops as the distance increases. What is important to note here is how sharply this tendency to move drops, when comparing local mobility to regional mobility. The decrease in mobility intentions as one contemplates regional mobility rather than international mobility is far less sharp. This suggests that people perceive that the costs of mobility increase significantly when it comes to regional mobility, and that the perceived costs of international mobility are fundamentally no higher than those for regional mobility.

Figure 7: *Predicted probabilities for longest intended move, by educational level (marginal effects)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

The plot of the probabilities also demonstrates that, when considering migration intentions according to educational level, the relative difference in migration intentions is particularly large for cross-border migration. This suggests that the balance of costs and benefits related to potential migration is more favourable for higher educated individuals.

Migration intentions in the EU15 and new Member States

5

The logit model for migration intentions has been estimated separately for the EU15 Member States, the six NMS with a low or average level of migration intentions – Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Cyprus, Malta – and the four NMS with a high level of migration intentions – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. The estimation results are reported in Table 7. Instead of discussing the outcomes from these models in detail, it is prudent to present and discuss the most striking differences in determinants of migration readiness among these three groups of countries. These are the effects of age, educational level and the expected effects of migration.

From the bi-variate analyses, it turned out that migration intentions among higher educated individuals in the NMS are stronger than among higher educated persons in the EU15 (Table 2). The estimates presented in Table 7 confirm this finding. Moreover, higher educated individuals in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are more inclined to express an intention to migrate than people with an average educational level; this effect is significantly greater than in the EU15. On the other hand, lower educated individuals in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland are significantly less inclined to express an intention to migrate. Hence, if it is accepted that migration is actually to take place from these high pro-migration NMS, migrants are more likely to be relatively higher educated than lower educated.

Table 7: *Logit model estimates for intended migration in EU15 and the NMS, coefficients from model and marginal effects*

	Beta coefficient			**Marginal effects (%)**		
	EU15	**NMS** low mobility[1]	**NMS** high mobility[2]	**EU15**	**NMS** low mobility[1]	**NMS** high mobility[2]
Female	-0.440**	-0.341	-0.364*	-1.3	-0.4	-2.1
Educational level (reference category: average)						
Lower	0.139	-0.704	-1.086*	0.4	-0.7	-4.1
Higher	0.390**	0.397	0.612**	1.2	0.5	3.8
Still studying	1.277**	1.515**	1.401**	6.3	3.7	13.3
Age (reference category: 35–44 years)						
18–24 years	1.694**	0.924	1.442**	9.9	1.6	13.2
25–34 years	0.975**	1.155**	0.998**	3.8	2.0	7.4
45–54 years	-0.372*	-0.747	-1.192**	-0.9	-0.7	-5.1
55–64 years	-0.613**	-0.830	-1.638**	-1.5	-0.8	-6.8
Employment status (reference category: employed)						
Unemployed	0.389*	1.467**	0.351	1.3	3.3	2.2
Retired	-0.098	0.368	-0.001	-0.3	0.5	0.0
Housewife/man	0.173	0.004	0.911**	0.5	0.0	7.1
Household type (reference category: couple, no child)						
Couple (with child)	-0.684**	-0.463	-0.721**	-1.7	-0.5	-3.5
Single person	0.485**	0.992**	0.314	1.6	1.7	1.9
Single parent	-0.293	0.942	0.388	-0.7	1.7	2.5
Divorced/separated	0.042	0.672	0.866**	0.1	1.0	6.4
Widowed	0.578	0.649	0.717	2.1	1.0	5.2
Homeowner	-0.647**	-0.426	-0.571**	-2.1	-0.6	-3.6
View on mobility	0.206**	0.220**	0.131**	0.6	0.3	0.7
Non-nationals	0.005*	-0.009	0.018*	0.0	0.0	0.1
Past mobility (reference catgory: never moved)						
Within region	0.074	0.728*	0.294	0.2	0.9	1.6
Across regions	0.584*	1.302*	-0.704	2.0	2.7	-3.1
Cross-border	1.396**	2.209**	1.366*	7.0	7.9	13.3

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 7: *Logit model estimates for intended migration in EU15 and the NMS, coefficients from model and marginal effects (cont'd)*

	Beta coefficient			Marginal effects (%)		
	EU15	**NMS** low mobility[1]	**NMS** high mobility[2]	**EU15**	**NMS** low mobility[1]	**NMS** high mobility[2]
Reason for last long-distance move						
Family related	-0.156	0.060	0.733	-0.4	0.1	5.3
Job related	0.271	0.426	0.614	0.8	0.6	4.3
Housing related	0.084	-1.043	-0.468	0.2	-0.8	-2.1
Age (reference category: 35–44 years)Perceived effect of future long distance mobility (fear for …)						
Loss of social networks	-0.445**	-0.657**	0.100	-1.3	-0.8	0.5
Loss of job or income	0.043	0.048	0.190	0.1	0.1	1.1
Language	-0.571**	-0.639	0.174	-1.3	-0.6	1.0
Housing situation	-0.046	-0.329	-0.110	-0.1	-0.4	-0.6
Public facilities	-0.199	-0.059	0.301	-0.5	-0.1	1.8
EU15 – country dummies (reference country: Belgium)						
AT	-1.026**			-2.0		
DE	-0.678*			-1.5		
DK	0.012			0.0		
EL	-0.555			-1.2		
ES	-1.337**			-2.3		
FI	0.267			0.8		
FR	0.134			0.4		
IE	0.076			0.2		
IT	-0.910**			-1.8		
LU	-0.065			-0.2		
NL	0.154			0.5		
PT	-0.886**			-1.7		
SE	0.447			1.5		
UK	0.487			1.7		
NMS low mobility – country dummies (reference country: Malta)						
CY		-0.748			-0.6	
CZ		-2.140**			-1.6	
HU		-1.422**			-1.1	
SI		-1.221**			-1.0	
SK		-0.975*			-0.9	
NMS low mobility – country dummies (reference country: Lithuania)						
EE			-0.479*			-2.3
LV			-0.086			-0.5
PL			-0.662**			-3.2
Constant	-2.846**	-2.856**	-1.988**	2.9	1.1	5.8
Pseudo R-squared	0.284	0.294	0.303			
N	7980	3018	2083			

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Note: *1 NMS low mobility: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia; 2 NMS high mobility: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.*

Source: *Eurbarometer data; own calculations*

Differences regarding the effect of age across countries are also striking. In all countries, potential migrants are more likely to be young, and older respondents are less likely to report pro-migration intentions. However, it is worth pointing out that this age pattern is much more pronounced in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, than in the other countries.

The previous chapter has shown that the potential loss of social networks is a major impediment to cross-border migration. As Table 7 indicates, this is true for respondents from the EU15 and NMS with low levels of migration intentions, but it is not the case for respondents from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.[16] In the latter countries, the effect for the feared loss of social networks is not significant. This either means that people in these four countries value social networks less or that they do not fear the assumed loss of social networks following migration. This could be due to the fact that they do not intend to migrate permanently. These two possible explanations require further research. It was finally observed that language barriers appear to be a migration barrier for EU15 respondents, but not for respondents from the NMS. Maybe the willingness of the latter to invest in acquiring new language skills is simply greater, because their perceived gains from cross-border migration are greater too. This difference is also in need of further empirical exploration.

[16] The effect for the feared loss of social networks is not significant.

6 Triggers and barriers to mobility

In the previous chapters, the main determinants of migration intentions have been highlighted. In the models outlined, direct information was used to estimate what people perceive to be the main barriers to international (cross-border) mobility. It was shown that it is especially the potential loss of social contacts and socio-cultural (language) differences that are dominant psychological obstacles to mobility. This section will briefly explore what people believe to be important factors which would motivate them to move abroad. Specific barriers to mobility within the EU are also looked at. Outcomes are shown for people both with and without moving intentions. From a policy perspective, and given the actual low mobility rate in the EU, the latter group is certainly as interesting as the first one.

Triggers to cross-border mobility

The Foundation report on mobility in Europe observes that the two main factors influencing intended future mobility are related to the respondents' labour market position, as well as to their need for discovering new environments and meeting new people (Vandenbrande et al, 2006). It is the balance of these motives in various sociodemographic segments that needs examining. Men are more labour and income-oriented than women. The same can be said for younger people (Figure 8) who, in addition, express mobility intentions in terms of adventure seeking, i.e. meeting new people and living in a new environment. With respect to educational level, the difference is especially large for lower educated individuals versus higher and average educated people. In fact, a high number of lower educated respondents stated that nothing would motivate them to migrate, not even the prospect of a higher income. This assessment explains their low level of migration intentions. It also illustrates that especially lower educated people are more strongly rooted in their local community and that consequently, increasing the mobility among this segment of workers would be quite a policy challenge.

Figure 8: *People (with or without migration intentions) indicating specific factors that would encourage them to move across borders, by age group and educational level (%)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Barriers to mobility within the EU

The Eurobarometer mobility survey included a question pertaining to the main problems people expect should they move to another EU country: 'In case you wanted to move to another European Union country, what do you think would be the most important difficulties you would have to face?' Respondents could give up to a maximum of three answers; all of the possible answers are shown in Figure 9.[17] Furthermore, Table 8 presents a breakdown by gender, educational level and age.

What worries people most, when they think about moving to another EU country, is their lack of language skills. The second most important expected difficulty is finding a job for oneself. This is followed by the perceived difficulty of having to adapt to another culture. In view of these findings, it can be concluded that, for most Europeans, cultural barriers in general, and language barriers in particular, are major obstacles to cross-border mobility. As one would expect, for younger people (aged 34 years or younger) and for higher educated people, language barriers appear to be a lesser mobility obstacle when moving within the EU.

Figure 9: *People expecting specific difficulties for moving within the EU (%)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

With the exception of some of the mobility barrier items, no significant differences emerge between men and women, across all age groups, or even across educational levels. However, apart from the distinct perceptions of language barriers that were mentioned above, it is necessary to emphasise three more differences. Firstly, the eldest group of respondents seems to fear less not being able to find a job, than younger people do. This is not to that they perceive their employment opportunities would be better should they move to another country. It could merely reflect that the older generation considers migration for other reasons than for job-related reasons. What these reasons exactly are, however, remains unclear in light of the data presented in Figure 8. Secondly, higher educated individuals appear to worry more about the

[17] It should be noted that answer categories are different from those used in the model presented in Table 4.

lack of recognition of their educational achievements and other job-related qualifications. Transparency of the international recognition of skills, one could argue, could help to promote the geographic mobility of higher skilled employees. Thirdly, a small proportion of the EU population fears for the transferability of pension rights when crossing borders. Given that the transferability of state pensions has been agreed upon among Member States, but that the transferability of occupational pensions is to be settled on the basis of bilateral agreements in Europe, this low proportion is somewhat surprising.[18] However, data show that younger people are less afraid of the assumed loss of pension rights. This finding could indicate an age effect: such institutional barriers to mobility do simply play a lesser role in the migration decision of the youngest generation of Europeans, as they are far away from their pension age. It might also be the case that they are more optimistic about the availability of future policy solutions to this problem.

Table 8: *People expecting specific difficulties for moving within the EU, by gender, age and educational level (%)*

	Gender		Age					Education		
	Male	**Female**	**18–24**	**25–34**	**35–44**	**45–54**	**55–64**	**Lower**	**Average**	**Higher**
Work related:										
Finding a job	34	36	42	40	39	34	19	31	37	35
Finding a job for your partner	9	11	8	12	11	11	5	8	9	12
Recognition of educational/ professional qualifications	9	10	15	12	11	9	4	4	8	15
Obtaining residency/ work permit	10	9	13	12	10	8	5	6	10	9
Language/culture:										
Lack of language skills	59	57	55	54	58	60	62	67	64	46
Adapting to a different culture	22	23	27	21	22	22	23	24	22	22
Public facilities:										
Access to childcare and education	3	6	4	8	6	2	1	2	5	5
Accessing healthcare or other social welfare benefits	13	13	10	12	13	14	16	12	13	15
Transferring your pension rights	11	10	6	7	8	12	19	11	10	12
Finding suitable housing	15	16	20	15	15	14	17	15	17	14

Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

[18] Survey data, of course, deal with psychological reality and not with the objective state of affairs.

Regional mobility within countries 7

Up to now, the cross-border migration intentions of Europeans in the next five years have been looked at. The Eurobarometer mobility survey, however, also allows to picture regional mobility intentions within the European countries (see the mobility readiness question in Chapter 2). This chapter will therefore explore the determinants of such regional mobility intentions, setting out with a brief description of regional mobility intentions by gender, educational level, age and household type. In addition, an attempt is made to model these intentions using a probability model. Just like the cross-border migration decision, the decision to move to another region within one's country can be understood from the theoretical model outlined in Chapter 1, but now the cost benefit analysis implies the necessity of comparing the net costs of moving to another region to the benefits of staying in one's current region.

Intentions to move across regions

As Figure 10 shows, the differences in regional mobility intentions across socioeconomic groups are somewhat similar to the differences in cross-border migration intentions described in Figure 1, albeit at a higher level. All in all, almost 9% of Europeans, aged between 18–64 years, intend to move to another region in their country within the next five years. It should be noted, however, that to move to 'another region but in the same country' has not been further specified in the questionnaire. The meaning of 'another region' is thus left to the appreciation of the respondent. This means that regional mobility as measured by Eurobarometer data is not necessarily comparable to other statistical sources, which generally use well-defined indicators for regions (such as NUTS levels in Europe).

The number of people who report an intention to move is greater than average among higher educated individuals and particularly so among students. The fact that so many young people and students report mobility readiness within their own country can probably in part be explained by the lack of regional dispersion of institutions for higher education. The intentions to move to another region are higher for single people, but lower than average for couples.

Figure 10: *People intending to move to another region (within the same country) within the next five years, by gender, educational level, age and household type (%)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Intended regional mobility is especially high in France and in the three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Finland and Sweden; conversely, it is particularly low in small countries such as Malta and Cyprus, and in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria (Figure 11).[19]

Figure 11: *People intending to move to another region, by country (%)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Although individual motives for regional mobility are important, it is likely that regional variations in basic economic parameters are vital in explaining the rate of regional mobility (OECD, 2005). Chapter 3 provided an illustration of the relationships between migration intentions and some central economic variables, such as GDP level and unemployment rate. In this section, the relationships between regional mobility intentions and regional differences in employment and unemployment rates are described. The data on regional differences in unemployment and employment rates are taken from the OECD (2005). However, such data are not available for all EU countries.[20]

[20] Data are lacking for several of the new Member States, including Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia, as well as for two of the EU15 countries, Denmark and Luxembourg.

As Figure 12 indicates, there is a negative relationship between the regional variation in unemployment rate and the percentage of persons intending to move to another region. As the dispersion in the unemployment rate increases, the proportion of people wanting to move to another region decreases. This suggests that people are either not responsive to different employment opportunities in other regions, or that a selection bias is operative, with most people already living in the regions with best employment opportunities. It would, of course, be interesting to test these alternative explanations more directly, but the present data are inadequate for doing so.

The relationship between regional differences in employment rate and the percentage of people intending to move across regions is also negative (Figure 13). However, if Italy – being a considerable outlier – is taken out of the equation, the analysis shows that regional mobility intentions do not react to changes in the dispersion of employment rates.

Figure 12: *Relationship between the proportion of people intending to move to another region and the regional variation in unemployment rate (%)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Figure 13: *Relationship between the proportion of people intending to move to another region and the regional variation in employment rate (%)*



Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Main determinants of regional mobility intentions

In order to investigate the chief determinants of regional migration intentions, a logit model similar to the one presented in Chapter 4 (equation [3]) was estimated. Here, the dependent variable measures whether or not respondents intend to move to another region in their country within the next five years. The variable is coded **0** for people who do not intend to move at all, and coded **1** for people who state an intention to move to another region. Respondents reporting a readiness to move within the region, or outside the country borders, were removed from the analysis. Since the comparison group is the same as in the analysis of migration intentions, the results can be compared.

The logit model results are presented in Table 9. Overall, the outcomes are more or less similar to the findings on migration intentions depicted in Table 4. This, however, is not very surprising. As Figure 7 illustrates, the real difference in mobility intentions is between mobility within the region and mobility outside the region, rather than between regional mobility and cross-border mobility.

While fewer women than men report an intention to move to another country, no gender differences emerge when it comes to regional mobility intentions. The effects for the human capital variables (age and educational level) are similar to the effects found in cross-border migration intentions. Higher educated individuals and students express a greater intention to move to another region. Younger people also more frequently indicate such intentions, while older people express a preference for staying in the region they currently live in.

Just like in the migration equation, unemployed people more often state a desire to move to another region; however, the effect is less pronounced. Again, this outcome may reflect dissatisfaction with the present employment situation, but it does not necessarily imply that more unemployed than employed people will actually migrate in the (near) future. The group of unemployed people is relatively small in size, and their actual chances of moving are likely to be reduced since they hold less human capital such as qualifications, skills and competencies.

Again, the presence of children in a household also proves to be an obstacle to regional mobility intentions; mobility potential among single people is significantly greater than among couples. Homeowners report lower mobility intentions. Past mobility appears to be positively, and significantly, related to regional mobility readiness. But contrary to migration intentions, the reason for the last move has no effect on regional mobility intentions.

The country dummies reflect the levels depicted in Figure 11. Replacing them by the variables measuring regional variation in employment or unemployment rate does not yield any significant effects.

Table 9: *Logit model estimates for intended regional mobility, coefficients from model and marginal effects*

	Beta coefficient	**Marginal effects (%)**
Female	-0.134	-0.6
Educational level (reference category: average)		
Lower	-0.214	-0.8
Higher	0.270**	1.2
Still studying	1.174**	8.1
Age (reference category: 35–44 years)		
18–24 years	1.591**	12.6
25–34 years	0.732**	3.8
45–54 years	-0.379**	-1.4
55–64 years	-0.591**	-2.2

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 9: *Logit model estimates for intended regional mobility, coefficients from model and marginal effects (cont'd)*

	Beta coefficient	Marginal effects (%)
Employment status (reference category. employed people)		
Unemployed	0.307*	1.4
Retired	-0.370*	-1.4
Housewife/man	-0.098	-0.4
Household type (reference category: couple, no child)		
Couple (with child)	-0.383**	-1.5
Single person	0.352**	1.6
Single parent	0.316	1.5
Divorced/separated	0.278*	1.3
Widowed	0.064	0.3
Homeowner	-0.879**	-4.6
Country dummies (reference country: Belgium)		
EU15		
AT	-0.943**	-2.7
DE	-0.176	-0.7
DK	0.368	1.8
EL	0.490*	2.5
ES	-0.383	-1.4
FI	0.885**	5.4
FR	1.589**	13.2
IE	0.153	0.7
IT	-0.057	-0.2
LU	0.280	1.3
NL	0.278	1.3
PT	-0.735*	-2.3
SE	0.918**	5.7
UK	0.663**	3.7
10 NMS		
CY	-0.423	-1.5
CZ	-1.016**	-2.9
EE	0.920**	5.7
HU	-0.677*	-2.1
LT	0.217	1.0
LV	0.578*	3.1
MT	0.105	0.5
PL	-0.006	0.0
SI	-0.377	-1.3
SK	0.635**	3.5
View on mobility	0.094**	0.4
Non-nationals	-0.002	0.0

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 9: *Logit model estimates for intended regional mobility, coefficients from model and marginal effects (cont'd)*

	Beta coefficient	Marginal effects (%)
Past mobility (ref: never moved)		
Within region	0.345**	1.4
Across regions	1.161**	7.1
Cross-border	1.034**	6.6
Reason for last long distance move		
Family related	0.034	0.1
Job related	0.193	0.9
Housing related	-0.281	-1.0
Constant	-3.000**	4.3
N = 13,081; Pseudo R-squared = 0.287		

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Source: *Eurobarometer data; own calculations*

Conclusions 8

The 2004 enlargement of the EU with 10 NMS has opened up the societal and policy debate in many EU countries. This debate centres on whether or not borders should be opened to allow the free movement of workers, and also on the effects of the free movement of workers. Will there be a massive migration of people all over Europe, particularly from NMS to old Member States, from eastern to western Europe? Or will the current institutional and cultural arrangements of push and pull factors restrict an uncontrolled stream of migrants? The current EU labour market policy agenda, as heralded by the 2006 'European Year of Workers' Mobility', encourages more mobility of the European workforce, specifically across borders. Setting and implementing this agenda is undoubtedly facilitated by having a clearer picture of how willing the European workforce is to be more geographically mobile, and also by better understanding the main micro and macroeconomic, social and cultural determinants of the willingness to migrate.

This study focuses on the migration intentions of Europeans and investigates the main determinants of such intentions. Although it is maintained that such intentions cannot be taken at face value, and therefore cannot be taken as perfect predictors of real future migration flows, this report primarily aims to investigate the drivers of such intentions. Use is made of the special module on mobility of the Eurobarometer Survey (EB 64.1) fielded in September 2005; data were collected in all 25 EU Member States. The survey is the most comprehensive recent Europe-wide survey on mobility intentions. This report analyses the micro and macro determinants of future mobility, relates past mobility to intended future mobility, compares migration intentions of people in the EU15 and NMS, and investigates some of the main barriers and triggers to cross-border mobility within Europe.

Findings indicate that most Europeans have no intention of moving to another country, nor to another region within their own country. Only 8.6% of the working-age population in Europe intends to move to another region within the next five years and 5.4% of Europeans intend to move to another country. It can therefore be concluded that, percentage-wise, intentional cross-border migration is not a widespread phenomenon in Europe to date. Mobility intentions are at a higher level in NMS – compared to the old Member States – although the variation within NMS is significant, with Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland displaying higher levels of migration intentions than other countries. Between 2001 and 2005, it can be seen that mobility intentions increased relatively more so in the NMS than in the EU15. This is especially evident with regard to higher educated individuals, which suggests an increased awareness among this population group in these countries to invest more in language skills.

Given the large population size of some of the countries which display a relatively high level of migration intentions such as Poland), it is conceivable that large numbers of people will indeed cross the borders. However, as Fassmann and Münz (2002) observe, the extent of labour migration from the eastern European countries will depend on the demographic development in those countries. The authors note that birth rates in the 10 NMS have been declining over the past decade, while mortality rates have been increasing. As a result of this shrink in population size, the younger cohorts will benefit from better chances on the labour market, which in turn might reduce their readiness to migrate. Moreover, Fassmann and Münz expect these countries to become destination countries for citizens from other eastern European countries such as Ukraine and Romania. The latter become an EU Member State since 1 January 2007. In addition, the projected positive economic and labour market developments in these countries (compared to the old Member States), due to increased foreign direct investment, and the sustained availability of regional and structural funds, will improve working and living conditions with the consequence of reduced incentives for nationals to migrate.

In particular, highly educated and highly qualified workers are more likely to cross regional or country borders within Europe. This is also true for for students. This could mean there are potential brain-drain risks for some regions in Europe, although these risks will depend on whether migration from the east will have a permanent character or not. Young Europeans are more likely to migrate than older Europeans, so some countries could not only be facing a brain drain, but also a youth drain. The issue is, whether this reflects an age effect or a cohort effect. If the latter option is the case, this would of course change future migration flows in Europe quite drastically. Systematic monitoring of inter- and intra–age cohort migration trends is essential for analysing this particular topic.

Mobility intentions, furthermore, appear to be strongly linked to past mobility behaviour: people who have migrated in the past are likely to migrate again in the future. Movers tend to stays movers, so it seems. The reason for past mobility, however, plays an important role in future migration intentions: people who crossed borders for job- related reasons are likely to do the same again in the future.

Perceived labour market opportunities are decisive motives for migration. An exception is noted among those in the workforce with poor qualifications and with a lower level of education. A larger number of people from this group express that in fact nothing would motivate them to migrate, not even the prospect of a higher income. Those with a lower level of education are more strongly rooted, so it seems, in local communities and families. To increase mobility within this segment of workers would pose a particular policy challenge. The findings of this study do not imply that all people with an intention to migrate will actually do so: existing social ties and socio-cultural differences are major barriers to cross-border migration. However, the analyses show that these barriers are less pronounced in NMS. In this sense, migration intentions are 'bound intentions', they have to be balanced with very diverse and diverging psychological, social and economic costs. Migration intentions are embedded in a decision-making hierarchy that involves a plurality of competing considerations.

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Annex 1: Migration intention questions in Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys, 1995–2005

2005 Eurobarometer mobility survey (EB 64.1) question

Data collected in EU25:

Do you think that in the next five years you are likely to move:

1. in the same city/town/village?
2. to another city/town/village but in the same region?
3. to another region but in the same country?
4. to another country in the European Union?
5. to another country outside the European Union?
6. you don't think you will move.

Multiple answers were possible.

2001 Eurobarometer survey (EB 54.2) question

Data collected in EU15:

Do you think you will move in the next five years?

If 'yes', a follow-up question was asked:

In the next five years, do you intend to move

1. within the same city, town or village?
2. to another city, town or village within the same region?
3. to another region within the same country?
4. to another country in Europe?
5. to live in a country outside Europe?
6. Are you sure where you will move to?

Multiple answers were possible.

2002 Eurobarometer survey (CC EB 2002.1) question

Data collected in the then candidate countries that joined the EU in May 2004:

Do you intend to move in the next five years?

If 'yes', a follow up question was asked:

In the next five years, do you intend to…

1. move within the same city, town or village?
2. move to another city, town or village within the same region?
3. move to another region with the same country?
4. move to another country within the European Union?
5. live in a country outside the EU?

Multiple answers were possible.

ISSP 1995 survey question

Data collected in 23 countries, comprising: Austria, Germany (data collected separately for east and west), Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden of the EU15; Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia of the new Member States; and other countries, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Russia and the US.

Would you be willing to move to another country to improve your work or living conditions?

0 very willing

1 fairly willing

2 neither willing nor unwilling

3 fairly unwilling

4 very unwilling'

Only one answer was possible.

